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Abstract
The coalition formation problem in an economy with externali-
ties can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function
form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose
that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus,
a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition
to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, taking
into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in
this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and
coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution
of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a
given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of parti-
tions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into
account), respectively. We give an application to Cournot oligopoly,
and two axiomatizations of the scenario-value.
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1 Introduction
The coalition formation problem is one of the important issues of economics
and game theory, both in cooperative and non-cooperative games. There are
several attempts to analyze this problem. Many papers tried to find stable
coalition structures in a cooperative game theoretic fashion (see, e.g., Ray
and Vohra [17], Diamantoudi and Xue [6], and Funaki and Yamato [9], or a
dynamic process using a non-cooperative approach, as Bloch [3]).
If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total
surplus, it is natural to assume that the grand coalition structure will even-
tually form after some negotiations. Then, the worth of the grand coalition
has to be allocated to the individual players, according to the contribution of
each player. The question is how to do that, taking into account the whole
process of coalition formation.
In a coalition formation problem, it is important to consider situations
with externalities. Typically, a coalition formation problem in an economy
with externalities is related to public goods, public bads and common pool
resource games. One of the best way to analyze it in game theory is to use
games in partition function form (PFF games for short) introduced in Thrall
and Lucas [18] (see also Funaki and Yamato [9]). A partition function assigns
a worth to each pair consisting of a coalition and a coalition structure which
contains that coalition. Such pairs are called embedded coalitions.1 Games in
partition function form are considered as a useful extension of classical TU
games, since they well capture the externalities in an economy [14].
Then the above problem of allocation of the worth of the grand coalition
amounts to defining a suitable solution concept or value for PFF games.
For TU games, one of the most well-known solutions is the Shapley value.
This solution concept is based on the marginal contribution of players when
they enter the game one by one, considering all possible orders. There are
already many attempts to define a modification of the Shapley value for
PFF games, e.g., by Myerson [16], Bolger [4], Pham Do and Norde [7], de
Clippel and Serrano [5], Albizuri et al. [1], Macho-Stadler et al. [15], etc.
They proposed several new kinds of null player or dummy player axioms,
and carrier axioms, which are extensions of the original axioms in TU games.
Then the resulting formulas are averaging of marginal contributions of players
when the players enter the game one by one. However, these approaches
do not reflect the process of coalition formation from singletons coalition
structure to the grand coalition structure. Since in TU games, the process of
1This term is used by de Clippel and Serrano [5], and Macho-Stadler et al. [15] among
others, and seems to have become the standard term in this field.
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entering of the players is expressed by some order on coalitions, in PFF games
the process of coalition formation should concern not only coalitions but also
the corresponding coalitions structures, so that it should be expressed by an
order on embedded coalitions.
Mathematically, the set of embedded coalitions has a structure much more
complicated than the lattice structure of coalitions in a TU game, however,
they share similar properties. One of the most interesting property is that all
the maximal chains (paths from the minimal element to the maximal element)
are of the same length. This means that a coalition formation process from
the singleton coalition structure to the grand coalition structure in a PFF
game has always the same number of steps. They clearly correspond to the
marginal contribution of a player in this coalition formation process, which is
a key concept to define the original Shapley value. Hence, roughly speaking,
a permutation of players in a TU game corresponds to a maximal chain in
the set of embedded coalitions for a PFF game.
Our idea is to take advantage of the structure of embedded coalitions
endowed with a suitable ordering, and to follow the original idea of Shapley
based on maximal chains. In this way we can propose a new value for PFF
games, which is rooted in the process of coalition formation.
An original feature of our approach is that we define three notions of value,
which are in some sense embedded one into the others. The first one, called
scenario-value, consider only one given maximal chain in the set of embedded
coalitions, i.e., a given scenario of coalition formation, starting from a single
player and arriving to the grand coalition. The second one, called process-
value, consider all scenarios which follow the same fixed sequence of partitions
of the society of players, starting from a society of individual players and
arriving to the grand coalition. The third one, which corresponds to the
usual notion of value, considers all possible processes (sequences of scenarios).
According to the applicative context, the one which best makes sense can be
used: in Section 5, we give an application to Cournot oligopoly, where the
process-value is the most appropriate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces em-
bedded coalitions and their structure, and Section 3 gives the definition of
scenarios and processes. Section 4 introduces our coalition formation value.
First, we introduce scenario-values and process-values, then we show how
the classical Shapley value can be recovered and axiomatized by the use of
scenario-values. Next, we introduce the axioms giving rise to what we call
the egalitarian scenario-value, and we give also a second axiomatization of
it. Then we give an explicit expression of the coalition formation value, and
finally we give the relation with the Shapley value when the game has no
externalities. After the application to Cournot oligopoly given in Section 5,
3
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we end the paper with a comparison of our value with other values of PFF
games.
2 Partitions and embedded coalitions
Let N := {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. We denote by S, T, . . . , the
subsets of N , and their cardinality by s, t, . . .. A subset of N is called a
coalition. A partition pi := {S1, . . . , Sk} is a collection of disjoint nonempty
coalitions S1, . . . , Sk with ∪kl=1Sl = N . Subsets S1, . . . , Sk are called blocks
of pi. We denote by Π(N) or Π(n) the set of all possible partitions of N . A
partition shows the structure of sub-groups in the player set, then it is usually
called a coalition structure. A partition with k blocks is called a k-partition.
A natural ordering of partitions is given by the notion of “coarsening” or
“refinement”, like an ordering of subsets. Taking pi, pi′ partitions in Π(N),
we say that pi is a refinement of pi′ or pi′ is a coarsening of pi, denoted by
pi ≤ pi′, if any block of pi is contained in a block of pi′ (or equivalently,
every block of pi′ fully decomposes into blocks of pi). Then (Π(N),≤) is a
lattice, called the partition lattice. With this ordering, the bottom element
of the lattice is the finest partition pi⊥ := {{1}, . . . , {n}} called the singletons
coalition structure, while the top element is the coarsest partition pi⊤ := {N}
called the grand coalition structure. An example with n = 4 is given below.
1,2,3,4
12,3,4 1,2,34 13,2,4 1,3,24 1,4,23 14,2,3
12,34 123,4 134,2 13,24 124,3 1,234 14,23
1234
An embedded coalition is a pair (S, pi), where S is a coalition such that
S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, and pi is a coalition structure such that S ∈ pi. We also call
S the base coalition of (S, pi). We denote by C(N) (or by C(n)) the set of
embedded coalition on N . For the sake of concision, we often denote by
Spi the embedded coalition (S, pi), and omit braces and commas for subsets
(example for n = 3: 12{12, 3} instead of ({1, 2}, {{1, 2}, {3}})). Remark that
C(N) is a proper subset of 2N×Π(N). We propose the following order relation
on embedded coalition, which is merely the product order on 2N ×Π(N):
(S, pi) ⊑ (S ′, pi′)⇔ S ⊆ S ′ and pi ≤ pi′.
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Evidently, the top element of this ordered set is (N, pi⊤) (denoted more simply
by N{N} according to our conventions). However, due to the fact that the
empty set is not allowed in (S, pi), there is no bottom element in the ordered
structure (C(N),⊑). Indeed, all elements of the form ({i}, pi⊥) are minimal
elements (i.e., there is no smaller element than them). For mathematical
convenience, we introduce an artificial bottom element ⊥ to C(N) (it could
be considered as (∅, pi⊥)), and denote C(N)⊥ := C(N) ∪ {⊥}. We give as
illustration the partially ordered set (C(N)⊥,⊑) with n = 3 (Fig. 1).
⊥
1{1, 2, 3} 2{1, 2, 3} 3{1, 2, 3}
12{12, 3} 3{12, 3} 1{1, 23} 23{1, 23} 13{13, 2} 2{13, 2}
123{123}
Figure 1: Diagram of (C(N)⊥,⊑) for n = 3. Elements with the same partition
are framed in grey.
Definition 1. A game in partition function form (PFF-game in short) on N
is a mapping v : C(N)⊥ → R, such that v(⊥) = 0. The set of all PFF-games
on N is denoted by PG(N).
Following the usual interpretation, the payoff for coalition S depends on
the situation of the outsiders, depicted by the partition pi, which represents
the externalities in an economy.
To be meaningful, we first assume that forming the grand coalition gen-
erates the largest total surplus, i.e., v(N{N}) ≥ ∑S∈pi v(S, pi), for all pi ∈
Π(N). Hence, we consider economic environments where doing so is the best
for the society and the total surplus v(N{N}) is distributed among the play-
ers in the society. In the same spirit, we assume that for a given coalition, the
more the society is organized, the better the payoff, i.e., for every coalition
5
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S, v(S, pi) ≤ v(S, pi′) if pi is finer than pi′. We call this condition monotonicity
w.r.t. the partition2,3.
We recall that in a partially ordered set (P,≤) with a bottom element
⊥ and a top element ⊤, a chain from ⊥ to ⊤ is a totally ordered sequence
of elements of P including ⊥,⊤. The chain is maximal if no other chain
can contain it (equivalently, if between two consecutive elements xi, xi+1 of
the sequence, there is no element x ∈ P such that xi < x < xi+1). If no
ambiguity occurs, we say maximal chain instead of maximal chain from ⊥
to ⊤. The set of maximal chains in P is denoted by C(P ). The length of
a maximal chain is the number of elements of the sequence minus 1. If all
maximal chains have the same length, this length is the height of the partially
ordered set. In Fig. 1, the sequence ⊥, 1{1, 2, 3}, 1{1, 23}, 123{123} is a
maximal chain, and there are 9 maximal chains in total, all of length 3, hence
the height of (C(123)⊥,⊑) is 3. Concerning the partition lattice Π(N), it is
easy to see that its height is n − 1. In [12], it is proved that (C(N)⊥,⊑)
is a lattice, whose maximal chains have all the same length n, hence the
height of this lattice is n. The combinatorial complexity of (C(N)⊥,⊑) is far
beyond the complexity of the Boolean lattice of coalitions in a TU game (for
n players, there are 2n coalitions and n! maximal chains), as illustrated by
the following facts [12]:
• The total number of elements is ∑nk=1 kSn,k + 1, where Sn,k is the
Stirling number of second kind.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
|C(n)⊥| 2 4 11 38 152 675 3264 17008
• The number of maximal chains from ⊥ to (N, {N}) is |C(C(n)⊥)| =
(n!)2
2n−1
.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
|C(C(n)⊥)| 1 2 9 72 900 16 200 396 900 12 700 800
For simplicity, we put c := |C(C(n)⊥)| and it is shown in [12] that |C(Π(n))| =
c
n
.
2In de Clippel and Serrano [5], this condition is called positive externalities.
3These conditions are here to ensure that our framework of coalition formation, defined
through the notions of scenarios, processes, etc., as it will be explained later, is meaningful.
Clearly, if the first condition is not fulfilled, the grand coalition will never form, and it is
“unlikely” to form if the second one does not hold. However, these conditions are not used
mathematically in the sequel, i.e., our definitions and results remain valid even if these
conditions do not hold.
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3 Processes and scenarios
Let us describe what we mean by a process of coalition formation. We con-
sider that we start from the society of individual players, and after several
steps of negociation, the grand coalition has formed. This is guaranteed by
our first assumption above. Moreover, we consider that at each step, exactly
two blocks (coalitions) of the current partition merge to form a new coali-
tion. This means that we first exclude that more than two blocks merge in
one or several new coalitions, and secondly, we exclude that a splitting of
some block occurs. The first condition is by no means a restriction, since
it simply decomposes the process in elementary steps, which is always pos-
sible4. The second condition is natural if we recall our second assumption,
namely that the game is monotonic w.r.t. the partition: coalitions do not
have incentive to split, therefore only merging can occur. Summarizing, we
can mathematically define a process as follows: A coalition formation process
P is any maximal chain in Π(n), i.e., a sequence of partitions starting from
pi⊥ (singleton coalition structure) and ending at {N} (the grand coalition).
The set of processes is C(Π(n)) =: P.
Our second fundamental ingredient is the notion of scenario. Let us
consider some process P. A process is an “external” description of how
coalitions form, as it could be seen by some observer outside the game. What
could be then an “internal” view? Obviously, this means how the process
is seen by some player in N . Let us consider player i ∈ N . At the initial
step, player i is alone, and during the subsequent steps, s/he will join with
some other blocks, to become finally included in N . Hence, the sequence
of embedded coalitions (S1, pi1), . . . , (Sn, pin), where the sequence pi1, . . . , pin
is P itself, and S1 = {i}, Sn = N and all S2, . . . , Sn−1 contain i, is the
internal view of the process P, seen by player i. We call this the scenario for
4This step-by-step approach, which allows only bilateral changes in merging at each
step, is useful in describing negotiation steps concretely. Actually, mergers of more than
two firms or organizations have been rarely observed. This is because the costs of merging
more than two organizations are much larger than those for two organizations. For exam-
ple, most of all mergers of major banks in Japan were bilateral and large banks have been
formed sequentially in bilateral mergers: Tokay bank and Sanwa bank merged and be-
came UFJ bank; Mitsubishi bank and Tokyo bank merged and became Tokyo-Mitsubishi
bank; Tokyo-Mitsubishi bank and UFJ bank merged and became Tokyo-Mitsubishi-UFJ
bank, which is Japan’s largest bank (this corresponds to process P′ in Section 5). An-
other example is Mitsui-Sumitomo bank, the third largest bank: Taiyo bank and Kobe
bank merged and became Taiyo-Kobe bank; Taiyo-Kobe bank and Mitsui bank merged
and became Sakura bank; Sakura bank and Sumitomo bank merged and became Mitsui-
Sumitomo bank (this corresponds to process P in Section 5). See also Houston et al.
[13] and Macho-Stadler et al. [15] for various examples of bilateral mergers in economic
environment.
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player i (in the process P)5. Summarizing, we get the following definition: a
scenario S in a process P is any maximal chain in C(n)⊥ so that the sequence
of partitions corresponds to P (notation: S ← P). The set of all scenarios,
considering all processes, is therefore C(C(n)⊥), denoted by S for simplicity.
For a given process P, there are n scenarios Si, i ∈ N . Note that a given
scenario belongs to a unique process. For example, in a 3 persons game with
N = {1, 2, 3}, we have three processes:
P1 : {1, 2, 3} → {12, 3} → {123}
P2 : {1, 2, 3} → {13, 2} → {123}
P3 : {1, 2, 3} → {1, 23} → {123}
In process P2, first players 1 and 3 merge, then coalitions 13 and 2 merge
and form the grand coalition. A process describes how exactly the coalition
structure evolves step by step, by a process of coalition formation.
Each coalition process has three scenarios. In the above example, process
P2 has the following three scenarios:
S1 : ⊥ → 1{1, 2, 3} → 13{13, 2} → 123{123}
S2 : ⊥ → 2{1, 2, 3} → 2{13, 2} → 123{123}
S3 : ⊥ → 3{1, 2, 3} → 13{13, 2} → 123{123}
In S1, player 1 first merges with player 3 at the singletons coalition structure,
then this base coalition 13 containing player 1 merges with player 2 and
becomes the grand coalition structure. Different views of players correspond
to different scenarios.
In a scenario S, some elements play a special role. We consider those
elements Spi such that in the sequence of elements of S from bottom to
top, Spi is the last element with base coalition S. They are called terminal
elements. Specifically, let us denote S by
S = {⊥, S1pi1,1, . . . , S1pi1,m1 , S2pi2,1, . . . , S2pi2,m2 , . . . , Skpik,1, . . . , Skpik,mk , N{N}},
(1)
with S1 ( · · · ( Sk 6= N . Then the terminal elements are Sipii,mi , i =
1, . . . , k. We denote by F(S) this family of elements. A terminal element is
an embedded coalition such that the base coalition of the embedded coalition
changes at the next step in the scenario. We will motivate this definition in
the next section.
5We may also say that the scenario tracks the history of player i in the coalition
formation process.
8
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Example 1. We consider 4 players and the following process P:
{1, 2, 3, 4} → {13, 2, 4} → {13, 24} → {1234}.
and the four different scenarios in P where terminal elements are in bold:
S1 : ⊥ → 1{1, 2, 3, 4} → 13{13, 2, 4} → 13{13, 24} → N{N}
S2 : ⊥ → 2{1, 2, 3, 4} → 2{13, 2, 4} → 24{13, 24} → N{N}
S3 : ⊥ → 3{1, 2, 3, 4} → 13{13, 2, 4} → 13{13, 24} → N{N}
S4 : ⊥ → 4{1, 2, 3, 4} → 4{13, 2, 4} → 24{13, 24} → N{N}
In scenario S1, player 1 first merges with player 3, then this coalition remains
unchanged in the next step, and finally base coalition 13 merges with coali-
tion 24, and becomes the grand coalition. Note that the second embedded
coalition is not a terminal element because at the next step the base coalition
does not change (player 1 is not concerned by the move).
4 Values for coalition formation processes
In this section, we introduce our concept of value for PFF games. Since it
is based on an interpretation in terms of coalition formation, we call it a
coalition formation value. To be more exact, we will define a whole family of
such values.
4.1 Scenario-values, process-values and values
Consider again the initial state of the society where all players are individual,
and no coalition has formed. We know from the previous section that under
our assumptions finally the grand coalition will form, following some process
P, and our aim is to share the total surplus of the game among the players,
taking into account the contribution of each player during the coalition for-
mation process. Here, two situations can arise: either we know precisely the
process P (i.e., the grand coalition has formed and we observed how it was
formed), or we do not know it, either because we were not able to observe
the process, or because the process has not yet realized. In the first situa-
tion, it seems natural to make the calculation of the sharing by using only
those embedded coalitions (S, pi) which are related to the process P, in other
words, all (S, pi) in the n scenarios of P, the other ones being irrelevant. We
call the sharing obtained in this way a process-value. In the second situation,
our ignorance obliges us to use a priori all embedded coalitions, since any
process may realize or have realized. If we have no knowledge at all about
9
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the process, the principle of insufficient reason tells us that we should con-
sider equally all processes; therefore, our value will be the arithmetic mean
of the process-values, for all possible processes P ∈ P. Otherwise, we may
define some weight vector on each process representing, e.g., a probability of
occurence of each process, and compute a weighted arithmetic mean. Hence,
depending on the practical situation under consideration, either the process-
value or the (weighted) value is better suited (see an example is Section 5).
Let us now consider a given process P and try to define the process-value.
Unlike global games [11] which assigns worths to partitions —and therefore
processes fully make sense for them, PFF games assign worths to coalitions
given a partition, and therefore we must consider the n scenarios induced
by a process, i.e., all possible sequences of embedded coalitions pertaining to
the same process. In each scenario, we should compute the contribution of
each player, which we call the scenario-value.
Summarizing the above discussion, we are lead to the following definition.
Definition 2. (i) A scenario-value is a mapping ψ : PG → Rn×|S|. Com-
ponents of ψ(v) are denoted by ψSi (v) for scenario S and player i. If
there is no confusion, we also call each component ψSi (v) a scenario-
value.
(ii) A process-value is a mapping ψ : PG → Rn×|P|. Components of ψ(v)
are denoted by ψPi (v) for process P and player i. If there is no confusion,
we also call each component ψPi (v) a process-value. Any scenario-value
ψ induces a process-value (denoted with some abuse by the same letter
ψ) by:
ψPi (v) :=
1
n
∑
S←P
ψSi (v), i ∈ N,P ∈ P.
(iii) A value is a mapping ψ : PG → Rn. Components of ψ(v) are denoted
by ψi(v) for player i. Any scenario-value or process-value ψ induces a
value by:
ψi(v) :=
n
c
∑
P∈P
ψPi (v) =
1
c
∑
S∈S
ψSi (v). (2)
4.2 The classical Shapley value revisited
We now revisit the classical Shapley value in our setting. In the classical case,
processes and scenarios collapse to simply sequences of coalitions induced by
the different orderings of the players: this is obvious from the mathematical
10
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structures of the two frameworks, since maximal chains in C(N)⊥ are scenar-
ios and maximal chains in 2N correspond to orderings (see in Section 4.6 for
the exact correspondance between processes, scenarios and orderings).
Let us consider a permutation σ and its associated scenario (sequence
of coalitions) S(σ) = {σ(1)}, {σ(1), σ(2)},. . . ,N . Shapley considers that the
contribution of player σ(i) is ∆i(v, σ) := v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i)})−v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i−
1)}). In our language, this defines a scenario-value
φ
S(σ)
i (v) = ∆i(v, σ), (3)
for any i ∈ N and any permutation σ on N . Then the Shapley value reads
φi(v) =
1
n!
∑
σ φ
S(σ)
i (v) as it is well known. Observe that this is exactly the
value induced by (3) through the mechanism (2).
Let us show briefly that it is easy to axiomatize, using axioms very close
to the classical ones. Our first axiom is linearity (L): the scenario-value ψ
should be linear on the set of games: ψ
S(σ)
i (v+w) = ψ
S(σ)
i (v)+ψ
S(σ)
i (w) for all
permutations σ and players i. The second axiom is the null axiom. We say
that player i is null in scenario S(σ) if v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i)}) = v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i−
1)}). Then the null axiom says that ψS(σ)i (v) = 0 if i is null in σ. The third
axiom is symmetry (S): for every permutation ρ on N , the value is insensitive
to ρ: ψ
S(σ)
i (v) = ψ
ρ(S(σ))
ρ(i) (v ◦ ρ−1). The last axiom is scenario-efficiency (SE):∑
i∈N
ψ
S(σ)
i (v) = v(N).
Then, the following holds.
Proposition 1. The Shapley scenario-value (3) is the only scenario-value
satisfying (L), (N), (S) and (SE).
Proof. It is easy to see that (3) satisfies all axioms. Conversely, from (L) we
immediately deduce that ψS(σ) reads
ψ
S(σ)
i (v) =
∑
S⊆N
γiS(σ),Sv(S)
with real coefficients γi
S(σ),S. Let S be the smallest set in S(σ) containing i,
and consider any game v such that v(S) := 1 and v(S \ i) = 1. Then i is null
in S(σ) for any such v, which by (N) entails
γi
S(σ),S = −γiS(σ),S\i, γiS(σ),T = 0, ∀T 6= S, S \ i.
It follows that
ψ
S(σ)
i (v) = γ
i
S(σ),S(v(S)− v(S \ i)).
11
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Let us apply now symmetry. We have for any permutation ρ on N :
ψ
ρ(S(σ))
ρ(i) (v ◦ ρ−1) = γρ(i)ρ(S(σ)),ρ(S)(v(S)− v(S \ i)),
therefore by (S) γ
ρ(i)
ρ(S(σ)),ρ(S) = γ
i
S(σ),S holds for every permutation ρ, every
i ∈ N, S ∈ S(σ). Clearly ρ(S(σ)) = S(ρ ◦ σ), therefore ρ(S) ∈ S(ρ ◦ σ) and
this set is the smallest containing ρ(i). Hence, we may consider that σ = Id,
and the set of coefficients reduce to γ1
S,{1}, γ
2
S,{1,2}, . . . , γ
n
S,N , where S is the
scenario {1}, {1, 2}, . . . , N . Observe then that the coefficients γi
S,S depends
only on the size of the set S. Therefore we obtain
ψ
S(σ)
i (v) = γ|S|(v(S)− v(S \ i)).
Finally we apply efficiency. We obtain for any game v:∑
i∈N
ψ
S(σ)
i (v) = γ1v({σ(1)}) + γ2(v({σ(1), σ(2)})− v({σ(1)})) + · · ·
+γn(v(N)− v({σ(1), . . . , σ(n− 1)}))
= v({σ(1)})(γ1 − γ2) + v({σ(1), σ(2)})(γ2 − γ3) + · · ·+ v(N)γn.
By (SE), we deduce the linear system
γ1 − γ2 = 0
γ2 − γ3 = 0
... = 0
γn−1 − γn = 0
γn = 1
whose unique solution is γ1 = γ2 = · · ·γn = 1. Therefore, ψS(σ)i = φS(σ)i , as
desired.
4.3 Axioms
Our task is now to translate the above axiomatization to PFF games. Due
to the much higher complexity of PFF games compared to coalitional games,
our task will be more difficult and we will need one more axiom, however the
principles remain the same.
A scenario-value satisfies linearity (L) if it is linear on the set of
PFF-games. We define similarly linearity for process-values and
values.
12
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Proposition 2. If ψ is a linear scenario-value, then for all v ∈ PG(N)
ψSi (v) =
∑
Spi∈C(n)
γi
S,Spiv(Spi), ∀i ∈ N, ∀S ∈ S
for some real constants γi
S,Spi (and similarly for a linear process-value, with
constants γi
P,Spi, and for a linear value, with constants γ
i
Spi).
Proof. As usual, consider the elementary PFF-games eSpi(S
′pi′) := 1 iff Spi =
S ′pi′ and 0 otherwise, for all Spi ∈ C(n). Then linearity for scenario-values
implies:
ψ(v) = ψ
( ∑
Spi∈C(n)
v(Spi)eSpi
)
=
∑
Spi∈C(n)
v(Spi)ψ(eSpi),
hence the result, letting ψSi (eSpi)) =: γ
i
S,Spi for i ∈ N , S ∈ S.
Remark 1. (i) Each linear value ψ is representable by at least one linear
scenario-value ψ′. Indeed, by linearity we have:
ψi(v) =
∑
Spi∈C(n)
γiSpiv(Spi) =
∑
Spi∈C(n)
v(Spi)
∑
S∋Spi
γi
S,Spi =
∑
S∈S
∑
Spi∈S
γi
S,Spiv(Spi),
taking any set of coefficients γi
S,Spi solution of the system
∑
S∋Spi γ
i
S,Spi =
γiSpi, Spi ∈ C(n). Evidently, this system has in general infinitely many
solutions. Then it suffices to take the scenario-value defined by ψ′Si (v) :=∑
Spi∈S γ
i
S,Spiv(Spi), i ∈ N , S ∈ S, which is linear. The same remark
applies to process-values as well.
(ii) If a scenario-value is linear, then clearly its induced value is linear too.
The converse is not true in general. Take simply n = 2 and call S1, S2
the two scenarios. Define for i = 1, 2:
ψS1i (v) := v(1{1, 2}) + (v(12{12}))2
ψS2i (v) := v(2{1, 2})− (v(12{12}))2.
Then clearly the scenario-value is not linear but the induced value is.
Definition 3. Let us consider i ∈ N , a scenario S, and denote by S−pi−
the last element in S not containing i, and Spi its successor in F(S), as in
Figure 2. Player i is null in scenario S for v if v(Spi) = v(S−pi−). Player i is
null for v if i is null for every scenario S.
13
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⊥S−pi−0
...
S−pi−
Spi0
...
Spi
N{N}
i 6∈
i ∈
Figure 2: Notation used for scenario S (terminal elements are in black, others
are in grey)
We make some comments on this definition. The intuition behind the
null axiom is that a player bringing no contribution should not be rewarded.
The difficulty here is to distinguish between the effect of one player enter-
ing the base coalition S− and any move in the coalition structure pi− (the
externalities). This principle prevents us to impose equality everywhere be-
tween Spi0 and Spi, because this would simply mean that externalities have
no effect on S. Therefore, there are two remarkable embedded coalitions
containing S, which are Spi0 and Spi, and player i should be said to be
null if v(S−pi−) is equal to either v(Spi0) or v(Spi). We choose the latter
for two reasons: under the hypothesis of positive externalities, v(Spi) is the
most favorable outcome for S inside scenario S (and doing so will impose
in fact v(S−pi−) = v(Spi0) = · · · = v(Spi)), and more surprisingly, choosing
the former makes the null axiom incompatible with efficiency, as it will be
shown in Remark 2. Therefore, both economically and mathematically we
are compelled to choose v(S−pi−) = v(Spi)6.
Scenario Null axiom (SN): If i is null in scenario S for v, then
ψSi (v) = 0.
Similarly as for linearity, if i is null for every scenario S, then ψi(v) = 0
(null axiom for the induced value), but the converse does not hold, that is,
if ψi(v) = 0 holds, then i is not necessary null in every scenario.
6A last possibility would be to impose v(S−pi−
0
) = v(Spi0). But this clearly takes into
account the change in externalities from pi−
0
to pi−.
14
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Proposition 3. Under (L) and (SN), for every scenario S, every player i,
the scenario-value reads
ψSi (v) = γ
i
S,Spi
(
v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)) (4)
with notation of Fig 2, and with real constants γi
S,Spi, i ∈ N , S ∈ S.
Proof. Take any scenario S, and define v(Spi) = v(S−pi−) = 1 and v(S ′pi′) = 0
otherwise. Then i is null for v in S. Then by (SN) we get γi
S,S−pi−
+γi
S,Spi = 0.
Now take v′ = v, except on a single element S ′pi′ ∈ C(n) different from
S−pi−, Spi. Since i is still null for v′ in S, we get by (SN) that γi
S,S′pi′ = 0.
The following is the usual symmetry axiom, but unlike in the classical
case, its effect on the simplification of the gamma coefficients will be much
weaker.
Symmetry axiom for the scenario-value (SS): For any i ∈
N , any S ∈ S, and any permutation σ on N , it holds
ψSi (v) = ψ
σ(S)
σ(i) (v ◦ σ−1)
with σ(S), σ(S, pi) defined naturally as follows: σ(S, pi) = (σ(S), σ(pi)),
where σ(S) = {σ(i) | i ∈ S}, σ(pi) = {σ(S) | S ∈ pi}, and
σ(S) = {σ(S, pi) | (S, pi) ∈ S}.
For any scenario S := (⊥, S1pi1, . . . , Snpin = N{N}), we can define what we
call its signature, which is the part of the scenario being invariant under
permutations. For this, we need an unambiguous way to arrange blocks in
the embedded coalitions of S. First, for pi1 = pi
⊥, an order on the blocks
(singletons) is fixed. Then, for any pik, k = 2, . . . , n − 1, the blocks are
arranged in decreasing order of their size, and blocks of same size are ar-
ranged in the lexicographic order induced by the order on singletons. We
call this the natural ordering. Now, the signature of S, assuming that
blocks are arranged with the natural ordering, is the sequence τ(S) :=
((s1, ρ(pi1), (i1, j1)), . . . , (sn−1, ρ(pin−1), (in−1, jn−1)), (n, (n))), where ρ(pik) is
the sequence of cardinalities of blocks of pik, and (ik, jk) denotes the index
numbers of blocks in pik which are merged to form pik+1
7. Note that there
are at most n! different scenarios with the same signature, generated by all
permutations on N .
7This is the long version of the signature, which contains many redundant information.
An equivalent shortest (and therefore irredundant) version is τ(S) = (i; (i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . .,
(in−2, jn−2)), where i is the index of S1 in pi1.
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Example 2. Consider the scenario S given by
1{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} → 12{12, 3, 4, 5} → 12{12, 34, 5} → 125{125, 34} → 12345{12345}.
Its signature’s long and shortest versions are
τ(S) =((1, (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (1, 2)), (2, (2, 1, 1, 1), (2, 3)), (2, (2, 2, 1), (1, 3)),
(3, (3, 2), (1, 2)), (5, (5)))
τ(S) =(1; (1, 2), (2, 3), (1, 3)).
The scenario S′ given by
4{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} → 14{14, 2, 3, 5} → 14{14, 2, 35} → 124{124, 35} → 12345{12345}
has the same signature and is obtained from S by the permutation 41532.
Proposition 4. Under (L), (SN) and (SS), the scenario-value takes the form
ψSi (v) = γ
i
τ(S),|pi|(v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)), (5)
for any scenario S and player i, with same notation as in Figure 2, τ(S) is
the signature of the scenario, and |pi| is the number of blocks of pi.
Proof. We know from (L) and (SN) that ψSi (v) takes the form (4). Hence,
for any permutation σ on N we have for any game v
ψ
σ(S)
σ(i) (v ◦ σ−1) = γσ(i)σ(S),σ(Spi)(v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)).
The (SS) axiom entails γi
S,Spi = γ
σ(i)
σ(S),σ(S,pi), and this holds for any permuta-
tion σ.
Considering the coefficient γi
S,Spi, we note that Spi ∈ S and i ∈ S \ S−.
Taking a permutation σ, it is plain that τ(σ(S)) = τ(S), |σ(pi)| = |pi|, and
that σ(Spi) ∈ σ(S), σ(i) ∈ σ(S) \ σ(S−). Conversely, take any scenario S′ of
same signature, S ′pi′ ∈ S′ such that |pi′| = |pi| and i′ ∈ S ′ \ S ′−, where S ′−
precedes S ′ in S′. Then there exists some permutation σ such that σ(S) = S′
and since |pi′| = |pi|, we have σ(Spi) = S ′pi′. Now observe that it is not
necessarily true that i′ = σ(i), as shown by the following example:
S =3{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} → 3{12, 3, 4, 5} → 34{12, 34, 5} → 34{125, 34} → N{N}
S
′ =3{5, 2, 3, 4, 1} → 3{25, 3, 4, 1} → 34{25, 34, 1} → 34{125, 34} → N{N},
and consider Spi = S ′pi′ = N{N}, and i = i′ = 1. Then σ must necessarily
change 1 into 5, i.e., σ(i) 6= i′. Therefore, the superindex i is necessary.
16
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By analogy with coalitional cooperative games, the unanimity game uSpi
centered on Spi is defined by uSpi(S
′pi′) = 1 if S ′pi′ ⊐ Spi and 0 otherwise.
The last axiom expresses the fact that for the unanimity game uSpi and any
scenario where Spi is a terminal element, there is equal contribution for all
players entering S in the scenario.
Egalitarian axiom (EG): consider a scenario S and Spi, S−pi− ∈
F(S) where S−pi− is the predecessor of Spi in F(S), and |S \S−| >
1. Then ∀i, j ∈ |S \ S−|, ψSi (uSpi) = ψSj (uSpi).
Proposition 5. Under (L), (SN), (SS) and (EG), the scenario-value takes
the form
ψSi (v) = γτ(S),|pi|(v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)) (6)
for any scenario S and player i ∈ N (same notation as in Figure 2).
Proof is immediate from (5).
Our last axiom is efficiency.
Scenario-efficiency axiom (SE): for every S ∈ S,∑i∈N ψSi (v) =
v(N{N}). Similarly, we define process-efficiency (PE) as∑i∈N ψPi (v) =
v(N{N}) for all P ∈ P, and efficiency (E) as ∑i∈N ψi(v) =
v(N{N}).
With some abuse, we say that a scenario-value is (process-)efficient if its
induced (process-)value is. Obviously, scenario-efficiency implies process-
efficiency anf efficiency.
Theorem 1. The unique scenario-value satisfying (L), (SN), (SS), (EG) and
(SE) is given by
φSi (v) =
1
|S \ S−|(v(Spi)− v(S
−pi−)),
with notation of Figure 2). We call it the egalitarian scenario-value.
Proof. The fact that the egalitarian scenario-value satisfies (L), (SN), (SS),
(EG) and (SE) is easy to check and left to the reader.
Conversely, let S = {∅pi⊥, S1pi1,1, . . . , S1pi1,m1 , S2pi2,1, . . . , S2pi2,m2 , . . . , Skpik,1, . . .,
Skpik,mk , N{N}} be fixed.
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From Proposition 5 we get:∑
i∈N
ψSi (v) = γτ(S),|pi1,m1 |v(S1pi1,m1) + |S2 \ S1|γτ(S),|pi2,m2 |
(
v(S2pi2,m2)− v(S1pi1,m1)
)
+
· · ·+ |Sj \ Sj−1|γτ(S),|pij,mj |
(
v(Sjpij,mj )− v(Sj−1pij−1,mj−1)
)
+
· · ·+ |N \ Sk|γτ(S),1
(
v(N{N})− v(Skpik,mk)
)
=
(
γτ(S),|pi1,m1 | − |S2 \ S1|γτ(S),|pi2,m2 |
)
v(S1pi1,m1)+
· · ·+ (|Sj \ Sj−1|γτ(S),|pij,mj | − |Sj+1 \ Sj |γτ(S),|pij+1,mj+1 |)v(Sjpij,mj)+
· · ·+ |N \ Sk|γτ(S),1v(N{N}).
From the (SE) axiom, we deduce the following linear system of k+1 equations
and k + 1 unknowns:
γτ(S),|pi1,m1 | − |S2 \ S1|γτ(S),|pi2,m2 | = 0
... = 0
|Sj \ Sj−1|γτ(S),|pij,mj | − |Sj+1 \ Sj |γτ(S),|pij+1,mj+1 | = 0
... = 0
|N \ Sk|γτ(S),1 = 1.
Evidently the system is nonsingular, since from the last equation γτ(S),1 is
obtained, then substituting it into the last but one, we get γτ(S),|pik,mk | and
so on. Knowing that the coefficients of the egalitarian scenario-value are
solutions of the system, it is the unique solution.
We call coalition formation value the value induced by the egalitarian
scenario-value.
Remark 2. We now show that the modified null axiom (where v(S−pi−) =
v(Spi0)) and scenario-efficiency are not compatible. It suffices to consider
n = 3 and to take a scenario which differs from the classical scenarios a` la
Shapley. First, it is not difficult to see that the modified axiom together with
linearity gives:
ψSi (v) = γ
i
S,Spi0
(v(Spi0)− v(S−pi−)).
Let us consider n = 3 and the scenario 1{1, 2, 3}, 1{12, 3}, 123{123}. We
obtain
ψS1 (v) = γ
1
S,1{1,2,3}v(1{1, 2, 3})
ψS2 (v) = γ
2
S,123{123}(v(123{123})− v(1{12, 3}))
ψS3 (v) = γ
3
S,123{123}(v(123{123})− v(1{12, 3}))
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Then efficiency yields
γ2
S,123{123} + γ
3
S,123{123} = 1
γ1
S,1{1,2,3} = 0
γ2S,123{123} + γ
3
S,123{123} = 0
which is clearly an incompatible system.
4.4 A second axiomatization
The egalitarian scenario-value is fully characterized by these axioms, which
are very similar to the classical axioms of the Shapley value for TU games.
However, every axiom is restricted to a single scenario in a coalition formation
process, therefore in some sense we have a local axiomatization. Imposing
that each scenario must satisfy these axioms may appear as a strong con-
dition. Our next axiomatization avoids this by using efficiency, the weaker
and most global form of efficiency, instead of the strong and local scenario-
efficiency.
As a starting point, we come back to the classical Shapley scenario-
value, and show that when replacing scenario-efficiency by efficiency (which
is weaker), the result still holds. Efficiency reads∑
i∈N
∑
σ
ψ
S(σ)
i (v) = n!v(N),
which gives
∑
σ
n∑
i=1
γi(v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i)})− v({σ(1), . . . , σ(i− 1)})) = n!v(N)
from which we deduce
γn = 1
(n− 1)!γ1 − (n− 1)!γ2 = 0
... = 0
(n− 1)!γn−2 − (n− 1)!γn−1 = 0
from which we get γ1 = · · · = γn = 1 as before. With PFF games, the
situation is more complex and we will need an additional axiom.
Consider the unanimity game uSpi0, where S is any nonempty coalition,
and pi0 is the finest partition pi0 containing S, i.e., pi0 = {S, pi⊥N\S}, where pi⊥N\S
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is the partition of N \ S in singletons. Then, any embedded coalition with
base coalition S has worth 1, and any embedded coalition with base coalition
S− ⊂ S has worth 0, whatever the externalities are. In this situation, for
a fixed S− ⊂ S, it is natural to say that the contribution of a player i ∈
S \ S− does not depend on the scenario S, provided that in the scenario S−
precedes S (more precisely, S−pi− precedes Spi in F(S), for some pi, pi−). Put
more bluntly, the organisation of the players in N \ S is irrelevant to the
contribution of i.
Independence of irrelevant players axiom (IIP): Consider a
nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , and pi0 the finest partition containing
S. Then for every scenarios S, S′ such that Spi ∈ F(S), Spi′ ∈
F(S′), where pi, pi′ are arbitrary partitions containing S, it holds
ψSi (uS{S,pi⊥
N\S
}) = ψ
S′
i (uS{S,pi⊥
N\S
}),
for every i ∈ S \ S−, where S−pi−, S−pi−′ are the predecessors of
Spi, Spi′ in F(S),F(S′) respectively.
Proposition 6. Under (L), (SN), (SS), (EG) and (IIP), we have, for any
scenario S, any Spi ∈ F(S) and its predecessor S−pi− in F(S)
ψSi (v) = γs,s−(v(Spi)− v(S−pi−)) (7)
for all i ∈ S \ S−. If S is a singleton, γs,s− is denoted by γ1,0.
Proof. Under (L), (SN), (SS), (EG), we already know that ψSi (v) has the
form (6), with coefficients γτ(S),|pi|. Fix S
− ⊂ S, any i ∈ S \ S− and any two
scenarios S, S′ defined as above. Then by (IIP) we get
γτ(S),|pi| = γτ(S′),|pi′|.
Since pi and pi′ can be any partitions containing S, the coefficients do not de-
pend on pi. Now, τ(S) has the form . . . , (s−, ρ(pi−), (i−, j−)), . . . , (s, ρ(pi), (i, j)), . . .,
and any sequence of that type with s, s− fixed is produced by some S defined
as above. Consequently, the dependency to τ(S) is reduced to the dependency
to s, s−.
Theorem 2. The egalitarian scenario-value is the unique scenario-value sat-
isfying (L), (SN), (SS), (EG), (E) and (IIP).
Proof. Again, the egalitarian-scenario-value clearly satisfies these axioms.
Conversely, let us assume that the scenario-value satisfies the five axioms,
and let us compute
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈Sψ
S
i (v). From
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈Sψ
S
i (v) = v(N{N}),
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we get a system of linear equations, one per element Spi. We know that there
exists at least one solution to this system, since our egalitarian scenario-value
satisfies the five axioms. Our task will be to prove that this is the only
solution. To this aim, we will prove that there are at least as many equations
as variables, and that there exists a subsystem which can be made triangular.
First, we determine the form of the equation for element Spi := S{S, S2, . . . , Sk},
assuming Spi is any element different from N{N} and S is not a singleton.
From (7), there is a negative contribution for v(Spi) with coefficient −γs+,s
for all S+pi+ such that S+pi+ ⊐ Spi, |S+| = s+, pi+ := {S+, S+2 , . . . , S+k+},
and S+ = S ∪ Sj , for some j = 2, . . . , k, for all i ∈ S+ \ S, and all scenarios
S passing through S+pi+ and Spi, such that S+pi+, Spi ∈ F(S). Hence, any
scenario of the following form, with S+ = S ∪ Sj :
⊥, . . . , Spi, S ∪ Sj︸ ︷︷ ︸
S+
piS∪Sj , . . . , S ∪ Sj︸ ︷︷ ︸
S+
pi+, S+∪S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
, . . . , N{N}, l = 2, . . . , k+
will lead to a negative contribution with coefficient −γs+,s. The notation
piS∪Sj , etc., is a shorthand for (pi \ {S, Sj}) ∪ {S ∪ Sj}. The set of all such
scenarios (for j fixed, i.e., S+ fixed) is obtained as all possible combinations
of:
(i) all sub-scenarios from ⊥ to Spi;
(ii) all sub-scenarios from S ∪ SjpiS∪Sj to S ∪ Sjpi+, for all possible pi+
coarser than piS∪Sj and containing S ∪ Sj ;
(iii) for a given pi+, all sub-scenarios from S+∪S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
to the top N{N},
for l = 2, . . . , k+.
Hence the number of such scenarios is
βs+sj ,s,pi = |C([⊥, Spi])|
∑
pi+>pi
pi+∋S∪Sj
(
|C([piS∪Sj , pi+])|×
k+∑
l=2
|C([S+∪S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
, N{N}])|
)
,
where the notation C([⊥, Spi]) stands for the set of maximal chains from ⊥ to
Spi, and so on (for the second term, since the coalition is always S+, we can
omit it). Although this number seems difficult to compute (!), it depends
ultimately only on k, s, s2, . . . sk, hence on the number of blocks of pi and
their cardinality. Indeed, the following results are shown in [12].
• Consider two distinct elements pi, pi′ ∈ Π(n), with pi′ < pi. Then
|C([pi′, pi])| = (k
′ − k)!
2k′−k
l1!l2! · · · lk!
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with pi := {S1, . . . , Sk}, pi′ := {S11, . . . , S1l1 , S21, . . . , S2l2 , . . . , Sklk},
with {Si1, . . . , Sili} a partition of Si, i = 1, . . . , k, and k′ :=
∑k
i=1 li.
• Let Spi be an embedded coalition, with pi := {S, S2 . . . , Sk}. The num-
ber of maximal chains from ⊥ to Spi is
|C([⊥, Spi)])| = s(n− k)!
2n−k
s!s2! · · · sk!.
• Let Spi be an embedded coalition, with pi := {S, S2 . . . , Sk}. The num-
ber of maximal chains from Spi to N{N} is
|C([Spi,N{N}])| = 1
k
|C(C(k)⊥)| = k!(k − 1)!
2k−1
.
We deduce from this:
|C([piS∪Sj , pi+])| =
(k − 1− k+)!
2k−1−k+
1.l+2 ! · · · l+k+!
|C([S+ ∪ S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
, N{N}])| = (k
+ − 1)!(k+ − 2)!
2k+−2
with l+2 , . . . , l
+
k+
being the numbers of blocks in piS∪Sj corresponding to S
+
2 , . . . , S
+
k+.
Clearly, |C([⊥, Spi)])| depends only on k and the cardinality of blocks of pi.
For |C([piS∪Sj , pi+])|, doing the summation over pi+, we have that k+ will vary
from 2 to k − 1. Accordingly, each l+j will vary from 1 (when k+ = k − 1) to
k (when k+ = 2). Hence the second term (after summation) depends only
on k. Similarly, |C([S+ ∪ S+l pi+S+∪S+
l
, N{N}])| depends only on k.
Similarly, there is a positive contribution for v(Spi) with coefficient γs,s−
for all S−pi− such that S−pi− ⊏ Spi, |S−| = s−, and S = S− ∪ S−1 for some
S−1 ∈ pi−, all i ∈ S \S−, and all scenarios S passing through elements Spi and
S−pi−, so that Spi, S−pi− ∈ F(S). Hence, any scenario of the following form,
with S−pi− defined as above
⊥, . . . , S−pi−, S− ∪ S−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
pi−
S−∪S−1
, . . . , Spi, S∪SjpiS∪Sj , . . . , N{N}, j = 2, . . . , k
will lead to a positive contribution with coefficient γs,s−. The number of such
scenarios is, reasoning as above,
αs,s−,pi =
∑
S−⊂S,|S−|=s−
pi−<pi,pi−∋S−,S−1
s.t. S=S−∪S−1
(
|C([⊥, S−pi−])|×|C([pi−
S−∪S−1
, pi])|
)
×
k∑
j=2
|C([S∪SjpiS∪Sj , N{N}])|
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Again, this number depends only on s−, the number of blocks of pi and their
cardinality. In summary, the equation for Spi 6= N{N} is
∑
s−<s
(s− s−)αs,s−,piγs,s− −
k∑
j=2
sjβs+sj ,s,piγs+sj,s = 0.
Let us address briefly the case of singletons and N . If S = {i}, the first
term is replaced by α1,0,piγ1,0, with
α1,0,pi =
k∑
j=2
|C([S ∪ SjpiS∪Sj , N{N}])|.
If S = N , the second term does not exist. In summary:
α1,0,piγ1,0 +
k∑
j=2
(s+ − s)βs+sj,s,piγs+sj,s = 0, (S is a singleton)∑
n−<n
(n− n−)αn,n−,{N}γn,n− = v(N{N}), (Spi = N{N}). (8)
From the above considerations, equations for Spi and S ′pi′ will be identical
if and only if s = s′, and pi and pi′ are of the same type (same number of blocks
and same cardinality of blocks). Hence, the number of different equations
for |S| = s is the number of integer partitions of n− s, denoted by p(n− s),
for s = 1, . . . , n (for n = s, there is only one equation, which is (8). Hence
we put p(0) := 1). For example, the numbers of integer partitions of 1, 2, 3,
4 are respectively 1, 2, 3, 5. Hence, for n = 2, 3, 4, 5 we have respectively 2,
4, 7, and 12 different equations.
The number of variables γs,s′ is much easier to compute. For s = 1, there
is only one variable, namely γ1,0. For 1 < s ≤ n fixed, s′ varies from 1 to
s− 1. Hence the total number of variables is:
1 +
n∑
s=2
(s− 1) =
n∑
s=2
s− n+ 2 = n
2 − n + 2
2
.
This gives for n = 2, 3, 4, 5 players, 2, 4, 7, 11 variables. It is easy to see that
this number is less or equal than the number of equations. Indeed, for large
n, the following formula is known:
p(n) ≈ 1
4n
√
3
exp
(
pi
(
2n
3
) 1
2)
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which is clearly exponential (see Andrews [2]).
It remains to find a subsystem of equations which can be made triangular.
Let us order the variables as follows: γ1,0, γ2,1, γ3,1, γ3,2, γ4,1, . . .. For each
variable γs′,s, except for γ1,0, let us find an equation using only variables up
to γs′,s. It suffices to take the equation for Spi such that the largest block of
pi \ {S} is of size s′− s. Doing so for all γs′,s, we form a subsystem. If in this
subsystem, we put for each equation γ1,0 on the right side, the subsystem
becomes triangular. So it has a unique solution in terms of γ1,0, which can
be determined by substituting all variables in the equation corresponding to
Spi = N{N}. This proves the uniqueness of the solution.
4.5 Explicit expression of the coalition formation value
We consider the elementary games eTσ for any Tσ ∈ C(N), defined by
eTσ(T
′σ′) = 1 iff Tσ = T ′σ′, and 0 otherwise. We have for any game v
in PG(N), v = ∑Tσ∈C(N) v(Tσ)eTσ. Since the egalitarian scenario-value is
linear, so is the value. Hence, for any game v in PG(N),
φi(v) =
∑
Tσ∈C(N)
v(Tσ)φi(eTσ).
It remains to compute φi(eTσ) for all i ∈ N and all Tσ ∈ C(N).
A first important thing is to notice that symmetry (SS) implies φi(eTσ) =
φj(eTσ) for all i, j ∈ T . Indeed, consider any permutation τ such that τ(T ) =
T , and τ is the identity on N \ T . Then, for any i ∈ T ,
φi(eTσ) =
∑
S
φSi (eTσ) =
∑
S
φ
τ(S)
τ(i) (eTσ◦τ−1) =
∑
S′
φS
′
τ(i)(eτ(Tσ)) =
∑
S′
φS
′
τ(i)(eTσ) = φτ(i)(eTσ).
From this and efficiency we immediately have:
φi(eN{N}) =
1
n
, ∀i ∈ N. (9)
Let us consider a given Tσ ∈ C(N), Tσ 6= N{N}, and consider any i 6∈ T .
Let us put for convenience σ = {T, T2, . . . , Tk} and consider that i ∈ T2. A
scenario S induces φSi (eTσ) 6= 0 if and only if S contains Tσ and the successor
of Tσ in S is T ∪ T2σT∪T2 , with σT∪T2 := (σ \ {T, T2})∪{T ∪ T2}, and in this
case φSi (eTσ) = − 1t2 . The number of such scenarios is (see proof of Th. 2)
t(n− k)!
2n−2
t!t2! · · · tk!(k − 1)!(k − 2)!,
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hence
φi(eTσ) = −2t(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!(t2 − 1)! · · · tk!, ∀i ∈ T2. (10)
Establishing the corresponding formulas when i ∈ T3, . . . , Tk successively we
deduce ∑
i6∈T
φi(eTσ) = −2t(k − 1)(n− k)!
n!n!
t!t2! · · · tk!(k − 1)!(k − 2)!,
hence, by efficiency we get:∑
i∈T
φi(eTσ) = 0−
∑
i6∈T
φi(eTσ)
=
2t(k − 1)(n− k)!
n!n!
t!t2! · · · tk!(k − 1)!(k − 2)!
which gives by symmetry:
φi(eTσ) =
2(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!t2! · · · tk!, ∀i ∈ T. (11)
Hence for any game v, we obtain:
φi(v) =
1
n
v(N{N}) +
∑
Tσ∈C(N)\{N{N}}
T∋i
2(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!t2! · · · tk!v(Tσ)
(12)
−
∑
Tσ∈C(N)
T 6∋i
2t(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!(t2 − 1)! · · · tk!v(Tσ),
where σ := {T, T2, . . . , Tk}, and it is assumed in the third term that i ∈ T2,
the second block of σ. An equivalent expression, although less computation-
ally efficient, is:
φi(v) =
1
n
v(N{N})
+
∑
Tσ∈C(N)
T 6∋i,T2⊃{i}
2t(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!(t2 − 1)! · · · tk!
[t+ 1
t
v(T ∪ iσT∪i)− v(Tσ)
]
−
∑
Tσ∈C(N)
T 6∋i,T2={i}
2t(n− k)!
n!n!
(k − 1)!(k − 2)!t!t3! · · · tk!v(Tσ)
with σT∪i the partition obtained from σ by moving i ∈ T2 to T .
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4.6 Relation with the Shapley value
Using (12), we give the explicit expression of the coalition formation value
for a three players game, (i, j, k denote any three different players):
φi(v) =
1
3
v(N{N}) + 1
9
v(ij{ij, k}) + 1
9
v(ik{ik, j})− 2
9
v(jk{i, jk})
+
1
9
v(i{i, jk})− 1
18
v(j{j, ik})− 1
18
v(k{k, ij})
+
2
9
v(i{i, j, k})− 1
9
v(j{i, j, k})− 1
9
v(k{i, j, k}).
It can be checked that this differs from the other values proposed so far for
PFF games (see their definitions in Section 6). One of the most important
difference appears when we apply this formula to TU games. If we consider
a PFF game with no externality, that is, v(Spi) = v(Spi′) for any pi and pi′
with pi ∋ S, pi′ ∋ S, it naturally corresponds to a TU game. We can define
the TU game vˆ from the PFF game v by:
vˆ(S) := v(Spi) for any S ∈ 2N , any pi ∋ S.
Then we have a value formula for a TU game from the coalition formation
value in three person games,
φi(vˆ) =
1
3
vˆ(N) +
1
9
vˆ(ij) +
1
9
vˆ(ik)− 2
9
vˆ(jk) +
1
3
vˆ(i)− 1
6
vˆ(j)− 1
6
vˆ(k).
This differs from the original Shapley value. Player i gets less share of vˆ(ij),
vˆ(ik), and −vˆ(jk) than s/he gets in the original Shapley value. However,
most of the proposed values for PFF games coincide with the original Shapley
value of TU games. This shows the fundamental difference between our value,
which is rooted into the idea of coalition formation process, and the other
ones, which are more in the classical coalitional view of games.
We elaborate more on this surprising result, and claim that we are able
to recover the classical Shapley value, provided we use the weighted version
of our value. In addition, we will get an interesting interpretation of the
Shapley value in terms of coalition formation. Let us consider as above a
game without externalities. Recall that the Shapley value can be interpreted
as the average marginal contribution of players when considering all possible
ways for the players to enter one by one the game, i.e., all permutations
on N . Now note that this can be represented as particular processes of
coalition formation. Indeed, suppose that players enter the game in the
order 1, 2, . . . , n. This corresponds to the process
{1, 2, 3, . . . , n} → {12, 3, 4, . . . , n} → {123, 4, . . . , n} → · · · → {123 · · ·n},
(13)
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with the following convention: in each partition of the process, the first block
is the block of players who have already entered the game (they already form
a coalition), the other ones are the remaining players (they are still outside of
the game). Note also that each process corresponds to two different orders:
in the above example, 2, 1, . . . , n corresponds to the same process. Therefore,
if we want to recover the Shapley value, only those processes should be taken
(there are 2/n! such processes), i.e., their weight is 2
n!
, and the weight of the
other ones is 0. Now, consider the above process and the scenarios S1 of
player 1 and S2 of player 2:
1{1, 2, 3, . . . , n} → 12{12, 3, 4, . . . , n} → 123{123, 4, . . . , n} → · · · → N{N}
2{1, 2, 3, . . . , n} → 12{12, 3, 4, . . . , n} → 123{123, 4, . . . , n} → · · · → N{N}.
Computing the marginal contribution of any player in these scenarios gives
exactly the contribution used in the formula of the Shapley value for a given
order, e.g., the contribution of player 3 in both is v(123{123, 4, . . . , n}) −
v(12{12, 3, 4, . . . , n}), which is equal to vˆ(123)− vˆ(12), while the contribution
of player 2 is vˆ(12)− vˆ(1) in S1 and vˆ(2) in S2. Therefore, putting a weight
of 1/2 to S1 and S2 and 0 to the other scenarios S3, . . . , Sn, we recover the
classical Shapley value by averaging all these processes. In summary
φSi (vˆ) =
2
n!
∑
Pσ
(1
2
φ
Sσ(1)←Pσ
i (v)+
1
2
φ
Sσ(2)←Pσ
i (v)
)
=
1
n!
∑
Pσ
(
φ
Sσ(1)←Pσ
i (v)+φ
Sσ(2)←Pσ
i (v)
)
,
for i ∈ N , where φS denotes the classical Shapley value of a TU game, and
Sσ(1) ← Pσ denotes the scenario of player σ(1) in the process of type (13)
induced by σ, that is
{σ(1), σ(2), σ(3), . . . , σ(n)} → {σ(1)σ(2), σ(3), σ(4), . . . , σ(n)} → · · · → {N}.
Hence, the difference between the classical Shapley value and our value lies
in the discarded scenarios S3, . . . , Sn in each process Pσ and the discarded
processes. While it is clear why processes other than the Pσ’s should be
discarded, let us explain why those scenarios are discarded. In Shapley’s
view, there is a distinction between players already in the game (those in the
room) and those still outside the game. Note that in process (13), only player
1 or player 2 can be first in the room and be present during all the process of
formation of the grand coalition, and these correspond precisely to scenarios
S1, S2. By contrast, in a coalition formation process, all players are always
present in the game, only the structure of the society evolves. Therefore, all
scenarios have to be taken into account. In summary, a well-defined coalition
formation value should never collapse to the classical Shapley value.
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Similarly, it is possible to recover the value φCS of de Clippel and Serrano
(and therefore of Pham Do and Norde, since they coincide, see Section 6).
Its formula is
φCSi (v) = φ
S
i (v˜), i ∈ N,
where v˜(S) := v(S{S, {k}k∈N\S}). Due to the definition of v˜, we see that the
only processes involved are, as in the case of the Shapley value, of the form
(13), for all permutations on N . Due to the previous result on the Shapley
value, in each such process, we take the scenario corresponding to the first
player entering the game. Therefore,
φSCi (v) =
1
n!
∑
Pσ
(
φ
Sσ(1)←Pσ
i (v) + φ
Sσ(2)←Pσ
i (v)
)
, i ∈ N.
5 Coalition formation process in Cournot oligopoly
In this section, we give an application of the values we defined to a coalition
formation process in Cournot oligopoly.
We consider a symmetric case where the worth of the embedded coalitions
depends only on the number of blocks of the partition, i.e., v(Spi) = vk, where
pi = {S, S2, . . . , Sk}. Symmetric Cournot oligopoly games and symmetric
common pool resource games satisfy this property (see Funaki and Yamato
[9]). Under this condition, the Shapley coalition formation value is always the
equal division of v(N{N}) because of the symmetry of v. Hence this value
is of no interest. However if processes matter, the value should also reflect
the coalition formation process, hence we consider the Shapley process-value
instead. In other words, to see the effect of a coalition process, a symmetric
game is more adequate, because the difference of evaluations of the players
arises from the asymmetry of the coalition formation process.
Consider a 4-person game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and two typical coalition
formation processes P and P ′, defined as follows.
P : {1, 2, 3, 4} → {12, 3, 4} → {123, 4} → {1234}
P
′ : {1, 2, 3, 4} → {12, 3, 4} → {12, 34} → {1234}
Coalition formation process P represents a situation where all players enter
the largest coalition one by one, while coalition formation process P′ repre-
sents somehow a symmetric coalition formation process. Here we suppose
that in the process only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasi-
ble because of high negotiation costs. As mergers of major banks after 1960
in Japan, bilateral mergers are widely observed in economic environments
(see Funaki and Yamato [10]).
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The Shapley process-values of the processes P and P′ are given by
φP =
(
2v1 + v2 + 3v3
24
,
2v1 + v2 + 3v3
24
,
v1 + 5v2 − 3v3
12
,
3v1 − 2v2
4
)
φP
′
=
(v1
4
,
v1
4
,
v1
4
,
v1
4
)
These are the averages of four Shapley scenario-values induced from the
corresponding processes P and P′. These values are interpreted as average
contributions of the players in the processes. They are symmetric for P′, but
not for P. However φP does not depend on v4 and φ
P
1 = φ
P
2 . This is because
in the first step of coalition formation process P, the roles of players 1 and 2
are very similar since both are first players to enter, and v4 has no influence
in that case. Here we could compare the contributions of the same firm in
the two different processes.
This result can be extended to the general case. First we give the Shapley
process-value for the following coalition formation process P in an n-person
game.
P : {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} → {12, 3, . . . , n} → {123, . . . , n} → · · · → {N}
The value becomes
φPk =
1
n
[
vn−k+2 + (k − 1)(vn−k+1 − vn−k+2) +
n−1∑
j=k
1
j
(vn−j − vn−j+1)
]
for k = 2, . . . , n− 1, and
φP1 = φ
P
2 , φ
P
n =
1
n
[v2 + (n− 1)(v1 − v2)] .
Consider next the case of n = 2m and a process P′ defined by
P
′ : {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , n} → {12, 3, 4, . . . , n} → {12, 34, . . . , n} → · · · → {12, 34, . . . , (n− 1)n}
→ {1234, . . . , (n− 1)n} → · · · → {1234, . . . , (n− 3)(n− 2)(n− 1)n} → · · ·
→ {12345678, . . . , (n− 3)(n− 2)(n− 1)n} → · · · → {123 · · · (2m−1), (2m−1 + 1) · · ·n} → {N}
The Shapley process-value for process P′ is given by φP
′
k =
v1
n
for k = 1, . . . , n,
which shows that everyone has a perfectly symmetric role in this process.
This can be explained as follows. Every single player makes a two-person
coalition when making the first coalition. Next, two two-person coalitions
merge into 4-person coalitions, and so on. In each step, both coalitions
have the same power. Then it is natural that finally each player has an
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equal contribution. We remark that this is just an evaluation of a players’
contributions in the processes, not the result of payoff negotiation among the
players.
Next we apply this to a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and con-
stant average costs. We assume that the efficient coalition {N} is formed.
Then we evaluate each firm’s contribution depending on the coalition forma-
tion process.
Let us consider the following Cournot model with n identical firms. Let
xi be firm i’s output (i = 1, . . . , n). The inverse demand function is given
by p = a − ∑ni=1 xi, and the total cost function of firm i is cxi, where
a > c > 0. Given a coalition structure pi = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk}, we assume that
each coalition Sj is a player who chooses the total output level of its firms to
maximize the sum of their profits, given the output levels of other coalitions.
Then it is easy to check that the total profit of each coalition Sj at a unique
Nash equilibrium is given by (a−c)
2
(k+1)2
. Without loss of generality, we assume
that a− c = 1. This gives
vk =
1
(k + 1)2
and implies
φPk =
1
n(n− k + 3)2+
(k − 1)(2n− 2k + 5)
n(n− k + 2)2(n− k + 3)2+
n−1∑
j=k
2n− 2j + 3
nj(n− j + 1)2(n− j + 2)2
for k = 2, . . . , n−1,
φP1 = φ
P
2 , φ
P
n =
5n− 1
36n
φP
′
k =
1
4n
for k = 1, 2, . . . , n,
Moreover it holds that for k = 2, . . . , n− 1,
φPk+1−φPk =
1
n
[
vn−k+1 − vn−k+2 + (k − 1
k
)(vn−k − vn−k+1)− (k − 1)(vn−k+1 − vn−k+2)
]
.
Since vk =
1
(k+1)2
is a concave decreasing function, the Shapley process-value
φPk of player k satisfies φ
P
1 = φ
P
2 < φ
P
3 ... < φ
P
n , because vn−k+1 − vn−k+2 >
0, k − 1
k
> k − 1 and vn−k − vn−k+1 > vn−k+1 − vn−k+2.
This shows that when players enter the game one by one, the later a
player joins the current coalition, the more the contribution of this player in
Cournot oligopoly. This is natural because vk =
1
(k+1)2
implies
vn − vn−1 < vn−1 − vn−2 < ... < v3 − v2 < v2 − v1.
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However the original Shapley value of TU games cannot be used to analyze
this situation because of the existence of externalities in Cournot oligopoly.
Moreover, no value for PFF games can be used, because they will all lead to
an equal division of v1 among players, and give no information on particular
processes.
Turning to the symmetric coalition formation process P′, we see that it
induces a symmetric contribution of the players.
For the sake of completeness, we give numerical results for the 4-person
case.
φP ≈ 1
4
(.138, .138, .206, .528), φP
′
=
1
4
(.25, .25, .25, .25).
The last player gets more profit in process P, which is more than one half.
Symmetric values for PFF games give the equal division 1
4
(.25, .25, .25, .25)
and do not say anything about a coalition formation process. However our
Shapley process-value shows the difference between two processes P and P′.
Process P′ is more egalitarian than process P. Even in a symmetric oligopoly,
the coalition formation process matters a lot.
Again we remark that this can induce the comparison of the two typical
bilateral coalition formation processes, but cannot imply the results of the
negotiations among firms. One might analyze each firm’s contribution in
historically given coalition formation process, like bank mergers in Japan, by
this way.
6 Related works and concluding remarks.
As we discussed in the three person example (Section 4.6), the coalition
formation value differs from other values of PFF games, since our value
reflects the whole (dynamic) process of formation of coalitions, while the
others one are more related to the coalitional (static) view of games. Here
we make a comparison of the different axiom systems.
Myerson’s value of a PFF game (Myerson [16]) is uniquely determined by
the following three axioms: (S: symmetry) for any permutation σ, ψi(v) =
ψσi(σv), (ADD: additivity) for any two games v, w, ψ(v+w) = ψ(v)+ψ(w),
and (CAR: carrier) if T is a carrier, that is, v(Tpi) = v(T ∩ S, pi ∧ {T,N \
T}) ∀Spi ∈ C(N), then ∑k∈T ψk(v) = v(N, {N}). (ADD) is a bit weaker but
almost the same as (L). (CAR) is an extension of that in TU games, which
is equivalent to the null axiom and the efficiency for the original Shapley
value. In this sense it is a direct generalization of an axiom system for the
original Shapley value. The most different axiom from our axiomatization of
our scenario-value is (CAR). It is important to mention that the Myerson’s
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value of a PFF game in three person game is not monotonic: if v(i{i, j, k})
increases, the Myerson’s value of player i decreases.
Bolger’s value (Bolger [4]) of a PFF game is uniquely determined by the
following five axioms: (S),(L), (E: efficiency), (B-null) if j is a null player,
that is, v(Spi) = v(S \ {j}pi′) for any S, pi, pi′ such that j ∈ S ∈ pi, pi′ =
{T ∪ j, S1 \ j, . . . , Sk \ j} with pi = {T, S1, . . . , Sk}, j ∈ N \T , then ψj(v) = 0,
and (MM: Modified Marginality) for any two games v, w, and i ∈ N , if for
any S ∋ i, and pi ∋ S,∑T∈pi,T 6=S[v(S, pi)−v(S\i, αiT )] =∑T∈pi,T 6=S[w(S, pi)−
w(S \ i, αiT )], then ψi(v) = ψi(w), where for i ∈ S, pi = {S, T, S1, S2, . . . , Sk},
αiT = {S \ {i}, T ∪ i, S1, . . . , Sk}. Axioms (MM) as well as (B-null) are
needed, which are both very strong. Again (B-null) is very different from our
(SN).
Pham Do and Norde ([7]) proposed a value of a PFF game which is
uniquely determined by the following four axioms: (S), (ADD), (E) and (DN-
null): if j is a null player, that is, v(S, pi∪{{j}}) = v(S∪{j}, (pi\{S})∪{S∪
j}) for any S ⊆ N \ {j}, for any pi ∈ Π(N \ {j}), then φj(v) = 0. Fujinaka
[8] gives a different axiomatization of the same value using (M:Marginality)
for any two games v, w, if v(S ∪{j}, (pi \ {S})∪{S ∪ j})− v(S, pi∪ {{j}}) =
w(S ∪ {j}, (pi \ {S}) ∪ {S ∪ j}) − w(S, pi ∪ {{j}})for any S ⊆ N \ {j}, for
any pi ∈ Π(N \ {j}), then φj(v) = φj(w). He characterizes it by (S), (ADD),
and (M). de Clippel and Serrano ([5]) also give another axiomatization of the
same value using a balanced contribution axiom. Again the key difference
is based on the null axiom (DN-null). The important remark is that the
formula of their value of a PFF game v is given by φ(v) = Shapley(v˜), where
v˜(S) = v(S, {S, {k}k∈N\S}), and Shapley(v˜) is the Shapley value of TU game
v˜. This means their value does not utilize the full information of the PFF
game.
Macho-Stadler et al. ([15]) proposed a collection of values for PFF games,
called average values. They are characterized by (SS: strong symmetry),
which is a stronger version of symmetry, (L), (E), and (B-null). The typical
representative of this family is given by this formula: φ(v) = Shapley(v¯),
where v¯(S) = 1
#{pi∈Π|pi∋S}
∑
{pi∈Π|pi∋S} v(Spi). It satisfies in addition (SI: simi-
lar influence): if players i and j have similar influence in games v, v′, that is,
v = v′ except for 2 elements S{S, i, j, S2, . . . , Sk} and S{S, {i, j}, S2, . . . , Sk},
and v(S{S, i, j, S2, . . . , Sk}) = v′(S{S, {i, j}, S2, . . . , Sk}), v(S{S, {i, j}, S2, . . . , Sk}) =
v′(S{S, i, j, S2, . . . , Sk}), then ψi(v) = ψi(w), and ψj(v) = ψj(w). This value
is also characterized by Albizuri et al. [1]. Clearly it utilizes the full infor-
mation given by the PFF game.
Our scenario-value is different from any of the values above, mainly be-
cause it is not the (classical) Shapley value of some TU game induced by
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the PFF game. Therefore, the null player axiom of the Shapley value of
TU games naturally induces the above special null axioms for PFF games,
which all differ from our null axiom. Moreover, we claim that the underly-
ing structure of embedded coalitions (which is not explicitely mentionned in
the above cited works) is implicitly suggested by the null axioms which are
employed. Indeed, in the case of TU games, the null axiom is based on the
difference between the worths of S and S \ i, assuming S ∋ i. These elements
are “neighbors” in the lattice (2N ,⊆). In the PFF case, our scenario null ax-
iom is defined along a maximal chain of C(N)⊥. The B-null axiom takes the
difference of worth between S{S, S2, . . . , Sk} and S \ i{S \ i, S2 ∪ i, . . . , Sk},
for S ∋ i. In C(N)⊥, these elements are not neighbors because they are on
the same level. To recover them as neighbors, one possibility is the following:
take the Boolean lattice (2N ,⊆). Duplicate each element S as many times
there are different possible coalition structures containing S, and indicate
these coalition structures. Put all possible links between duplicates of an
element S and duplicates of an element T if and only if these elements are
linked in the Boolean lattice. Doing so, the B-nullity condition appears for
neighbors elements. This structure also explains well the average approach:
it can almost be seen on the picture. For illustration, we give C(N) and the
structure induced by B-nullity for n = 3.
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